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Notes
Prisoner Property Deprivations: Section 1983 and
The Fourteenth Amendment
Few areas of the law have undergone such rapid and recent change as
that of prisoners' rights. Under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,' and
its incorporation of the fourteenth amendment, state prisoners are provided
a federal forum in which to challenge various aspects of their incarcera-
tion.2 Claims arising from personal property deprivations at the hands of
the state's agents, however, have received uneven treatment in the midst of
section 1983's visible growth. These deprivations occur both negligently3
and intentionally4 and are uniformly challenged under section 1983 and its
'Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Section 1983 was originally passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, otherwise
known as "the Ku Klux Klan Act," "the Third Civil Rights Act," and "the third 'force bill'."
The wording of this section is substantially the same as the original. Very few actions were
brought under the Act until the Supreme Court revealed is tremendous potential in Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), ninety years after the Act was adopted.2Specific rights that have been held applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment are also covered by the "double incorporation" of section 1983. In fact, it has
b en this very "double incorporation" of constitutional rights that has made section 1983 such
a powerful guarantor of personal rights to prisoners. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d
178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972) (freedom of speech); McCleary v. Kelly,
376 F. Supp. 1186 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (access to the news media); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546
(1964) (religious discrimination); Andrade v. Hauck, 452 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1971) (access to.
the courts); Brown v. Dugger, 456 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1972) (availability of legal documents);
Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969) (solitary confinement examined);
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (cruel and unusual punishment); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (withdrawal of good time credit without proper due process
protection).
3E.g., Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1975); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311
(7th Cir. 1975); Watson v. Stynchombe, 504 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1974); Clayton v. Wade, 487 F.2d
595 (5th Cir. 1973).4E.g., Diamond v. Thompson, 523 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1975); Carroll v. Sielaff, 514 F.2d
415 (7th Cir. 1975); Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1974); Montana v. Harrelson, 469
F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1972); Weddle v. Director, Patuxent Insti., 436 F.2d 342 (4tfh Cir. 1970), rev'd
mem., 405 U.S. 1036 (1972); Urbano v. Calissi, 384 F.2d 909 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 925 (1968); Howard v. Higgins, 379 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1967); Butler v. Bensinger, 377 F.
Supp. 870 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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jurisdictional counterpart, section 1343(3),5 which requires no minimum
amount in controversy.
Although on many occasions prisoner property claims have been
sustained,6 the underlying sentiment is that they do not pose proper issues
for federal litigation. This sentiment has found expression in dismissals
based on notions of judicial abstention or non-intervention, 7 the characteri-
zation of claims as frivolous and inconsequential, 8 and the simple
conclusion that personal property deprivation claims must be heard in state
courts. 9 One of the most notable cases exemplifying the problem is Russell
-This jurisdictional section grants original jurisdiction to the federal district courts
over any civil action authorized by law and commenced by any person:
To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).6Diamond v. Thompson, 523 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1975); Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 523 F.2d
1057 (7th Cir. 1975); Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1975); Carroll v. Sielaff, 514 F.2d
415 (7th Cir. 1975); Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1974); Russell v. Bodner, 489 F.2d
280 (3d Cir. 1973); Montana v. Harrelson, 469 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1972); Weddle v. Director,
Patuxent Insti., 436 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd mem., 405 U.S. 1036 (1972).7See Howard v. Swenson, 426 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1970). Prisoner, seeking return of
several pairs of civilian shoes and $250,000 in damages, alleged a deliberate confiscation. His
complaint was dismissed by the court noting that the plaintiff was "attempting to make a
federal case over 'several pairs of black low-cut civilian shoes.' " Id. The court based its
dismissal primarily on the notion that except in extreme cases, courts may not interfere with
the conduct of the prison, its regulations, or disciplinary actions by prison authorities. See
also Butler v. Bensinger, 377 F. Supp. 870, 875 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Argentine v. McGinnis, 311 F.
Supp. 134, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). This doctrine is generally known as the "hands off" doctrine
and was also expressed in earlier prisoner rights cases: "[I]t is not the function of the Courts
to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to deliver
from imprisonment those who are illegally confined." Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483, 485 (5th
Cir. 1952). For further discussion of the "hands off" doctrine see Comment, Beyond the Ken
of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE
L.J. 506 (1963); Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L.
REv. 985 (1962). In recent years, however, the importance of the doctrine has faded
considerably. In Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971), it was noted that courts
necessarily must review the decisions of prison officials to preserve constitutional protections
for incarcerated persons. Id. at 1232. The Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974), has recently cited various instances in which courts inquired into constitutional
protection to be afforded prisoners. The Court appears to have abandoned allegiance to the
"hands off" doctrine in stating: "There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution
and the prisons of this country." Id. at 555-56.8See Pitts v. Griffin, 518 F.2d 72 (8th Cir. 1975). Often dismissals are based on 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1970), which allows federal district courts to dismiss actions brought in
forma pauperis if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.'Unfortunately-,
it is too easy for the courts to invoke this protective device in response to what is truly a good
faith claim which happens only to involve a very small amount in controversy. See also
Almond v. Kent, 321 F. Supp. 1225 (W.D. Va. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 200 (4th
Cir. 1972).
91n Butler v. Bensinger, 377 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Ill. 1974), the court stated that "while
the federal courts certainly did not condone the conversion of an inmate's property, they
necessarily insist that such allegations and charges be heard in the state courts." Id. at 875. See
Urbano v. Calissi, 384 F.2d 909 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 925 (1968), where the court
found:
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v. Bodner,0 in which a section 1983 claim was brought in a federal district
court by a state prisoner alleging an unconstitutional deprivation of
property without due process. The interesting, if not shocking, fact in this
case was that the property over which the district court had been convened
consisted of seven packages of cigarettes. The district court dismissed the
prisoner's complaint, but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed and remanded for trial in a per curiam opinion." One judge, in a
separate concurring opinion, observed:
Having been reluctantly persuaded that the ancient maxim "de minimis
non curat lex" does not apply to civil rights actions... it is my view that
this Court has no choice but to conclude that the district court erred in
dismissing the complaint as frivolous.
This result may well be expected to come as a surprise to the district
judge who dismissed the complaint. It will also no doubt generate a
certain amount of disbelief in those taxpayers and citizens generally, not to
mention judges and lawyers, who will ask how federal courts have come to
be concerned with a case in which a state prisoner alleges simply that his
constitutional rights were violated when a prison guard took seven
packages of cigarettes from him. I have yet to answer this question
satisfactorily for myself. 2
Plaintiff, without warrant, is deliberately seeking to avoid his obvious State remedy.
His complaint is simply a vague assertion that the defendants appropriated some of
his personal property to their own use. He sets out in essence a simple common law
offense for which complete relief is readily available under New Jersey law.
384 F.2d at 910. See also Lingo v. Boone, 402 F. Supp. 768, 772 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
10489 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1973).
"Id.1489 F.2d at 282. Chief Justice Burger has expressed his concern over federal courts
handling three dollar prisoner property claims as well. In an address to the American Bar
Association the Chief Justice said:
In one case a prisoner in a state penitentiary filed a complaint in a federal district
court under the Civil Rights Act, claiming that a prison guard had arbitrarily taken
seven packages of cigarettes from him without justification. The district judge
dismissed the complaint. The prisoner then took an appeal to the Court of Appeals
for the -Third Circuit, where three circuit judges, after reading briefs and
considering his arguments, wrote an opinion remanding the case to the district
court with directions to conduct a trial on the merits. . . . Under established
procedures the three circuit judges first had to submit their proposed opinion and
the concurring opinion of one of the three to the other six members of the court of
appeals who were not assigned to the case. ...
The first reaction of many people would be that such a case was governed by
the ancient maxim of the law that courts need not take notice of trifles. But to a man
confined in prison, more often than not in a cell six-by-eight feet, seven packages of
cigarettes do not seem a trifle. Apart from being private property, cigarettes are a
source of comfort to some people. When the district judge received the court of
appeals' opinion, he plaintively asked if he could dispose of the whole lawsuit by
sending the prisoner three dollars or seven packs of cigarettes.
Some would hope that prisoners would find more comfort in seven books or
seven candy bars, but whether books, candy, or cigarettes, the grievance was real to
the man who lost them. What most people will find difficult to understand about
this case is why the people who make and construe the laws - Congress and judges
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The obviously troubling aspect of prisoner property claims is that the
property seized or lost is seldom of more than trifling value.'3 It is ironic
that federal judicial energy is expended on cases involving small pecuniary
amounts, particularly where such cases do not raise issues generally
cognizable as of federal interest. Most of these cases involve elementary
tortious conversions, redress of which has traditionally been left to the state
courts.' 4 The problem is further aggravated by the fact that federal courts
are already seriously overloaded with prisoner complaints. 5 On the other
hand, it clearly cannot be said that a prisoner's rights in property are
- have not thought to deal with such a problem without, to use the vernacular,
"making a federal case out of it."
Burger, Report on the Federal Judicial Branch - 1973, 59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1128 (1973).
13See, e.g., Pitts v. Griffin, 518 F.2d 72 (8th Cir. 1975) (portable radio); Cruz v. Cardwell,
486 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1973) (about $200 in cash); Weddle v. Director, Patuxent Insti., 436 F.2d
342 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd mem., 405 U.S. 1036 (1972) (cigarettes, toothpaste and other
personalty with an aggregate value of about $3.50); Howard v. Swenson, 426 F.2d 277 (8th Cir.
1970) (several pairs of civilian shoes); Urbano v. Calissi, 384 F.2d 909 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 925 (1968) (items of clothing); Lingo v. Boone, 402 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Cal.
1975) (transistor radio with batteries); Butler v. Bensinger, 377 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
(art equipment, art effects and commissary goods); Almond v. Kent, 321 F. Supp. 1225 (W.D.
Va. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1972) (prisoner's shoes).14The Supreme Court has recently commented upon the extention of federal jurisdiction
to cases traditionally actionable only in the state courts. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976),
plaintiff's name and photograph were includedin a flyer distributed among merchants by
police chiefs. The flyer was captioned "Active Shoplifters." The Court held that reputation
alone does not implicate any "liberty" or "property" interests sufficient to require due process
protection, and that a simple defamation by a state official is insufficient to establish a valid
claim under section 1983. The Court also observed:
Respondent brought his action, however, not in the state courts of Kentucky,
but in a United States District Court for that State. He asserted not a claim for
defamation under the laws of Kentucky, but a claim that he had been deprived of
rights secured to him by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Concededly if the same allegations had been made about respondent
by a private individual, he would have nothing more than a claim for defamation
under state law. But, he contends, since petitioners are respectively an official of
city and of county government, his action is thereby transmuted into one for
deprivation by the State of rights secured under the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is hard to perceive any logical stopping place to such a line of reasoning.
Respondent's construction would seem almost necessarily to result in every legally
cognizable injury which may have been inflicted by a state official acting under
"color of law" establishing a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. We think it
would come as a great surprise to those who drafted and shepherded the adoption of
that Amendment to learn that it worked such a result, and a study of our decisions
convinces us they do not support the construction urged by respondent.
Id. at 697-98. See also Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's
Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORD. 557.
'
5See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 88-89 (1973); H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 330-375 (2d ed. 1973); Aldisert,
Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983,
Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORD. 557; Burger, Report on the Federal
Judicial Branch - 1973, 59 A.B.A.J. 1125 (1973); Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids:
Reshaping the Judicial System, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 901 (1971); McCormack, The Expansion of
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altogether inconsequential; even a package of cigarettes can be very
important to a man confined in prison.16
In view of the Supreme Court's express rejection of any distinction
between personal liberty and property rights for purposes of federal
jurisdiction under section 1983 and 1343(3),"7 the federal courts are deprived
of one simple method by which to avoid hearing civil suits over small
Federal Question Jurisdiction and the Prisoner Complaint Caseload, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 523.
16The view that such cases pose proper issues for federal litigation has been expressed by
Professor McCormack:
The burden on federal judges can be tested by the famous three dollar
cigarette case, Russell v. Bodner. The allegations in the complaint were that a
prison guard had taken food from a prisoner, the prisoner complained, the guard
asserted plenary power to take anything from a cell and demonstrated by taking
several packages of cigarettes from the plaintiff. These facts are so simple that it is
difficult to imagine a trial to determine their truth taking more than one hour, if a
trial were needed. The objection that this case has occupied the attention of many
federal judges could have been obviated if the district judge had not dismissed it as
frivolous, requiring an appeal. Why do judges think this case will shock the
taxpayers? Precisely because it is so simple and involves so little money. Of course,
the plaintiff could have made this a $10,000 case simply by praying for punitive
damages much as diversity plaintiffs pray for pain and suffering damages to create
jurisdiction. As a taxpayer I am immeasurably more shocked at the vast amount of
judicial resoruces that are expended on a five-year antitrust case between two
corporations that were wealthy at the start, will be wealthy at the conclusion, and
who have contributed substantially to the wealth of their lawyers at the expense of
the American public.
If cases such as Russell take even a full half-day of trial, they are worth the
trouble. The allegations involved much more than seven packs of cigarettes; they
involved alleged official corruption of power in the prison system. If true, then they
should be redressed. More importantly, if they are false, then they should be so
labelled only after a full judicial trial and not after a mere administrative
investigation.
McCormack, The Expansion of Federal Question Jurisdiction and the Prisoner Complaint
Caseload, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 523, 549-50.
17The distinction between personal and property rights, originally articulated by Justice
Stone in his concurring opinion in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 518 (1939); directed that the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 protected only rights based in personal liberty, ".... not dependent
for [their] existence upon the infringement of property rights .... ." Id. at 531. This
conclusion, according to Justice Stone, was necessary in order to reconcile 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3),
and its grant of federal jurisdiction to protect against deprivation of rights, with 28 U.S.C. §
1331 and its minimum amount in controversy requirement.
The property rights exception expressed by Justice Stone drew considerable criticism
from both judges and legal writers. See, e.g., Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D.
Cal. 1970); Collins v. Bolton, 287 F. Supp. 393, 401 (N.D. I1. 1968); Hombeak v. Hamm, 283
F. Supp. 549, 554-556 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (dissent), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 9 (1968); Joe Louis
Milk Co. v. Hershey, 243 F. Supp. 351, 354, 357 (N.D. Ill. 1965); Laufer, Hague v. C.I.O.: Mr.
Justice Stone's Test of Federal Jurisdiction - A Reappraisal, 19 BuFFALO L. REv. 547 (1970);
Note, Section 1343 of Title 28 - Is the Application of the "Civil Rights-Property Rights"
Distinction to Deny Jurisdiction Still Viable?, 49 B.U.L. REv. 377 (1969); Note, The "Property
Rights" Exception to Civil Rights Jurisdiction - Confusion Compounded, 43 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1208 (1968).
The test proposed by Justice Stone was subject to several major criticisms: (1) it ignored
the great difficulty of distinguishing between personal and property rights in cases where both
were affected. See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); (2) it is not justified by the language of either section 1983
or 1343(3); and (3) the distinction is not supported by the legislative history of the statute.
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amounts of personal property. 18 While dismissals based on doctrines of
non-intervention and the like serve a legitimate federal interest in conserva-
tion of judicial resources, they fail to provide a sound theoretical basis for
exclusion of such prisoner property claims from the federal courts. As the
number of prisoner suits continues to grow, so does the need for careful
analysis in order to reach a solution that is both effective and credible. This
note will outline and discuss one solution that may serve to reconcile the
desire to preserve federal judicial energy with the important interest in
providing a forum for vindicating wrongful deprivations of property by
prison guards. The goal is to remove cases not raising issues of federal
interest from the federal courts without foresaking the prisoner's need for a
remedy. The success of the approach will turn on its theoretical
acceptability and its practical workability.
THE INCOMPLETE DEPRIVATION THEORY
IN NEGLIGENT DEPRIVATIONS OF PRISONERS' PROPERTY
Bonner v. Coughlin,9 a Seventh Circuit decision, illustrates one
approach to the dilemma which may prove sound in cases where the loss of
dn item of property is the result of negligent misconduct of a prison guard.
In Bonner, an inmate, upon returning to his cell from a prison work detail,
found his trial transcript missing. The prisoner brought an action under
section 1983 against two prison guards who allegedly caused the loss of the
transcript by negligently failing to close the prisoner's cell door after
performing a routine "shakedown search." The prisoner alleged that the
guards' negligence deprived him of his property in violation of the
fourteenth amendment due process clause. 20 The court found that three of
the prerequisites of a valid due process claim had been stated: the guards
had acted "under color of" state law; 21 the transcript satisfied the definition
Although the distinction was never formally adopted by the Supreme Court, it was
conclusively laid to rest in Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972): "This Court
has never adopted the distinction between personal liberties and proprietary rights as a guide
to the contours of § 1343(3) jurisdiction. Today we expressly reject that distinction." Id. at
542.
'
8 Weddle v. Director, Patuxent Insti., 436 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd mem., 405 U.S.
1036 (1972). In Weddle a state prison inmate was deprived of various articles of personal
property which had an aggregate value of $3.52. The prisoner sued under section 1983 for a
deprivation of his property without due process. The district court dismissed the action for
lack of jurisdiction; the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that where allegations complained of
infringement solely of property rights, federal jurisdiction did not lie unless the minimum
amount in controvesy was alleged. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, however, in a
memorandum opinion, "for further consideration in light of Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp."
405 U.S. at 1036. See note 17 supra.
19517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975).
20Bonner also claimed that the taking of his transcript violated the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. A third theory of liability, the only
one upon which Bonner's complaint was allowed to stand, was that the taking or loss of his
transcript had interfered with his right of access to the courts under the sixth amendment.21judge Stevens noted that before Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), plaintiff's
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of property; and the negligently caused loss amounted to a deprivation. 22
Yet the court concluded that the remaining essential element of a
constitutional violation was absent; there had been no denial of due
process. This finding was premised on the fact that the state offered the
prisoner a remedy against the guards in its own courts. 2 3 The court, in an
opinion written by Judge Stevens, 24 summarized its position:
It seems to us that there is an important difference between a challenge
to an established state procedure as lacking in due process and a property
damage claim arising out of the misconduct of state officers. In the former
situation the facts satisfy the most literal reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment's prohibition against "State" deprivations of property; in the
latter situation, however, even though there is action "under color of" state
law sufficient to bring the amendment into play, the state action is not
necessarily complete. For in a case such as this the law of Illinois
provides, in substance, that the plaintiff is entitled to be made whole for
any loss of property occasioned by the unauthorized conduct of the prison
guards. We may reasonably conclude, therefore, that the existence of an
adequate state remedy to redress property damage inflicted by state officers
avoids the conclusion that there has been any constitutional deprivation of
property without due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.25
claim would have failed, on the theory that unauthorized acts of prison guards should not be
treated as acts "under color of" state law.
Originally "under color of" law was read to mean that section 1983 applied only to
action authorized under state law. See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
In Screws, it was held that under color of state law actually meant "under pretense of
law." The approach is more appropriately worded, "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of
state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law, is action taken 'under color of' state law." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
(1941). See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), particularly Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion. Id. at 192.
As illustrated in the prisoner property deprivation cases, it is possible that the meaning
presently attributed to the phrase extends section 1983 coverage in some cases beyond
originally intended bounds. Regardless of whether wrongful acts of a state agent should be
covered, it is clear that at least in this setting, a more narrow reading would accomplish the
objective of removing negligent or intentional tortious deprivations of property from the
federal courts. Unfortunately such a sweeping revision in the meaning of "under color of"
state law would exclude many other desirable and important cases from the federal courts.
22517 F.2d at 1318.
2SArticle 13, section 4 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution waives any defense based on
sovereign immunity in an action brought against the state, "[e]xcept as the General Assembly
may provide by law .... " ILL. CONsT. art. 13, § 4. The Illinois General Assembly elected to
retain the defense of sovereign immunity "[e]xcept as provided in 'An Act to create the Court
of Claims ....... ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 801. Section 8(d) of the Court of Claims Act
allows recovery up to $100,000 for the negligent acts of state employees. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
§ 439.8(d). Furthermore, the defendants in Bonner appeared to possess no claim to state-
created immunity that could prevent their liability in Illinois courts. Cf. Kelly v. Ogilvie, 35
Ill.2d 297, 220 N.E.2d 174 (1966).24Judge John Paul Stevens was subsequently named to the United States Supreme
Court. He was sworn in on December 19, 1975.2513onner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1975).
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Such reasoning reflects a significant departure from the approach taken
by other courts dealing with prisoner property claims based on the
fourteenth amendment. The most significant feature of Judge Stevens'
approach is the careful scrutiny of the individual elements of the prisoner
complaint, and the key to the Bonner holding is the analysis of the
consitutional "duty" allegedly breached by the guards. Because section
1983 imposes liability only in cases where, by its own terms, a person is
subjected to "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution . . . ,",26 actual constitutional interpretation
must take place in every section 1983 claim. Some constitutional right
must be found to exist and to have been infringed for a prisoner's claim to
survive.27
Most cases in which the sufficiency of a prisoner property complaint is
tested have failed to discuss the contours of the fourteenth amendment due
process clause in any significant detail. Implicit in holdings that a section
1983 claim arising out of negligent loss or destruction of property states a
cause of action is the notion that there is a completed constitutional
violation in the form of deprivation of "rights, privileges, or immunities"
once loss or damage to property occurs. 28 It is this type of failure to
carefully examine the underlying fourteenth amendment "duty" that has,
in some cases, resulted in impractical and unintended extensions of section
1983 liability.29 Arguably, such an overextension has taken place in the
context of prisoner property claims arising out of unauthorizqd deprivations
at the hands of prison guards. Allowance of section 1983 complaints where
no constitutional duty is breached transforms the Civil Rights Act from an
affirmative protector of federally created rights into a federal tort remedy
with no requirement of a minimum amount in controversy.
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
and Predeprivation Requirements
In Bonner, the court found only a potential fourteenth amendment
violation in the guards' loss of prisoner's property.30  "Incomplete
deprivation" suggests that the relevant constitutional inquiry underlying
any such section 1983 claim is not exhausted until it is determined that no
2642 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See text cited in full at note 1 supra.
27See cases cited at note 65 infra & text accompanying.28See, e.g., Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1975); Watson v. Stynchombe, 504
F.2d 393 (5th Cit. 1974); Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1974); Cruz v. Cardwell, 486
F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1973); Culp v. Martin, 471 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1973); Montana v. Harrelson,
469 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1972).29See Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 13-
25 (1974). See also Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973); Roberts v. Williams, 456
F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971), addendum, 456 F.2d 834 (5th Cir.
1972); Hopkins v. County of Cook, 305 F. Supp. 1011, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
3
°See note 25 supra & text accompanying.
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remedy is otherwise provided to redress the taking of property. In Bonner
that saving remedy comes in the form of a state-created statutory cause of
action against the tortfeasor guards after the initial taking or loss of
property.3' It is the availability of this state judicial hearing that satisfies
procedural due process hearing requirements.
The relevant portion of the fourteenth amendment reads: "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... ,,32 Generally, due process requires a fair opportunity to
be heard and to defend one's rights before the state or its agents interfere
with them.33 In most cases the deprivation of a property right is pursuant
to some established state procedure, and the opportunity for a hearing can
be easily offered before any actual deprivation takes place.34  The
requirement of a predeprivation hearing in these circumstances is the
product of a citizen's natural interest in the continued right "to enjoy what
S1For purposes of analysis, the remedy provided by the state of Illinois is considered to
be a make-whole remedy providing a tort remedy for:
All claims against the State for damages in cases sounding in tort, if a like
cause of action would lie against a private person or corporation in a civil
suit ... provided, that an award for damages in a case sounding in tort shall not
exceed the sum of $100,000 to or for the benefit of any claimant.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.8(d).
S2U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (1970).
ssSee Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
267 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 550-52 (1965); Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 338 (1963);
Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211-12 (1962); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141,
146 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Anderson
Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944); Brinkerhoff-Faris Tr. & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281
U.S. 673, 678 (1930); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908).
The Supreme Court expressed this principle as early as the 1860's when it held in
Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1863), that a discharge under a state insolvency law
was ineffective against an out of state reditor: "Common justice requires that no man shall
be condemned in his person or property without notice and an opportunity to make his
defence." Id. at 233.
S4E.g., in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), where a prejudgment replevin statute
allowed secured creditors to obtain writs in ex parte proceedings, the Court held that due
process was violated because of the lack of a prior hearing. The Court reasoned that the
debtor's possessory interest in the property and the interest in preventing wrongful seizures
outweighed the possibility of harm to the goods while in the debtor's possession.
In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), a state statute provided that after an accident
involving an uninsured motorist, the uninsured's license and registration might be taken
without a prior hearing to determine possibility of fault and liability. The Court there held
that because a driver's license may often be involved in the livelihood of a person, it could not
be summarily taken without a prior hearing.
In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), the Court held that a state statute
allowing "posting" of a person's name in liquor stores and taverns to warn proprietors not to
serve those listed because of their "problem drinking" was unconstitutional. The severe
public embarrassment and ridicule likely to arise from such a public classification requires an
opportunity to be heard before the "posting." But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). See
also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (pre-termination hearing required in cases of
welfare termination because of obvious need and lack of economic ability to sustain necessities
of life pending a final determination).
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is his, free of governmental interference."' 5  Thus, in cases where
deprivations of property are authorized by an established state procedure,
due process serves as a check on the state's "monopoly of power." When a
property owner is afforded an opportunity to speak on his own behalf, and
the state is constitutionally bound to listen to his side of the issue before
interfering with property rights, unfair or mistaken deprivations are
generally preventable.3 6
Cases sustaining section 1983 prisoner property claims arising out of
negligent loss of property by a state agent assume that any interference
with property rights under color of state law must be measured against this
concept of due process and that the interference with such rights must be
preceded by an opportunity to be heard. Under such logic courts have
allowed prisoners a federal remedy to attack property deprivations in the
federal courts. They have concluded that only a predeprivation hearing
will satisfy procedural due process and that, therefore, when a state agent
takes property before a hearing is provided, the literal procedural require-
ments of the fourteenth amendment are violated.37 That conclusion,
however, is not unavoidable. Under "incomplete deprivation" analysis, a
court takes full advantage of the flexibility necessarily inherent in the due
process clause; the requirements of due process in any particular case must
be determined by the specific factual setting and the interests involved.38
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
and Postdeprivation Requirements
In one specific line of cases the normal predeprivation due process
standard has been relaxed so that procedural due process may be satisfied
by a hearing at some time subsequent to the initial interference with rights.
This line of cases deals primarily with "summary action," that is,
interference with a property right without first providing an opportunity to
be heard.
Summary action cases have generally been justified by the necessity for
S5 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). See also Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405
U.S. 538, 552 (1972).36Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 81. The Court cited Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J. concurring), for the proposition that
"fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of
rights .... [And n]o better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a
person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it."
Id.
"See cases cited in note 6 supra.
s
8See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600, 610-12 (1974); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 263-66 (1970); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951). See also Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134, 168-69 (opinion of Powell, J.), 190-92 (opinion of White, J.) (1974); Tyler v.
Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1103-5 (5th Cir. 1975).
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the government or its agencies to act immediately if some vital public
interest is to be enforced.39  In such cases, the normal preincident
opportunity to be heard may be relaxed and property rights infringed by
the government without first providing a hearing. Thus, summary
authority has been invoked to seize adulterated or mislabelled food and
drugs, 40 to appoint conservators to take control of floundering and insecure
banks, 4' to halt transactions in securities, 42 and to meet the emergency
needs of a war effort.43 While the specific areas in which the government
has been allowed to take property from a citizen without first providing a
hearing are varied, there are factors common to all such cases: the necessity
of quick action by the state, the impracticality of providing any type of
meaningful preseizure hearing, and the availability of some means by
which to assess the propriety of the state's infringement at some time after
the initial taking.
"Incomplete deprivation" analysis seeks to invoke the flexible due
process standard illustrated by the summary action cases.4 4 Initially the
jump from summary action to "incomplete deprivation" and allowance of
a postponed due process standard in prisoner property deprivations seems a
large one. Obviously no traditional public emergency is created when a
negligent guard causes the loss of an inmate's personalty. There are,
however, similarities between the two types of cases that justify extension of
the relaxed due process standard.
One justification for the summary action postseizure hearing standard
S9See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Fahey v.
Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Corn Exchange
Bank v. Coler, 280 U.S. 218 (1930); Central Tr. Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921); North
American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299
F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962).401n North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908), the Supreme
Court sustained the state's right to seize and destroy food which is unwholesome without
providing a preseizure hearing. The possibility of an erroneous destruction of property was
not troubling to the Court since a party whose property was mistakenly destroyed could
recover his damages in an action at law after the incident. The Court felt that the public
.health emergency presented by distribution of unsafe food justified summary action since
there could be no delay without risk of injury to the public.
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 544 (1950), allowed summary seizure
and destruction of drugs in the interest of protecting the public health.4 Protection of the public interest against economic harm has been held to justify
summary action and seizures of property without a prior hearing when substantial questions
of malfeasance or incompetence were raised about a bank's management. Fahey v. Mallonee,
332 U.S. 245 (1947).
42See R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 307 U.S.
911 (1962).41n Central Tr. Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921), the Supreme Court held that
Congress had the power to provide for immediate seizure of property in time of war without
prior hearing when such property was believed to belong to the enemy. See also United States
v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547 (1921) (summary seizures allowed to meet the needs of the war effort).
44See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). Mr. Justice White, writing for the
majority, found an ex parte sequestration procedure valid. The Court discussed the
requirements of due process:
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is the impracticality of any preseizuire hearing. Generally the state has
recognized the possiblity that at some time action in the form of seizures
will be required. In most cases this foresight is embodied in some statute
providing summary authority. The specific instances, however, in which
the state will need to exercise its summary authority are not foreseeable.
When misbranded or unsafe food is introduced into commerce, or factors
suddenly indicate mismanagement and insecurity of a financial institution,
the state must take property immediately. No prior hearing is constitu-
tionally required because the specific occurrence that triggers the seizure
arises so suddenly that any meaningful prior hearing is effectively
precluded. "Incomplete deprivation" calls for similar treatment where the
need for a remedial hearing in tortious conversions of prisoners' property is
generally anticipated and provided for by statute,45 but the specific
occasions when the actual need for that hearing will arise cannot be
accurately foreseen. In the case of a loss of property due to the negligence
of a prison guard, the state has no way to know precisely when the loss will
occur. In such a situation, it is difficult to conceive of the meaningful
hearing that could possibly be provided before the deprivation; the taking
of property, while attributable to the state as action "under color of" law,
46
Petitioner asserts that his right to a hearing before his possession is in any
way disturbed is nonetheless mandated by a long line of cases in this Court,
culminating in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The pre-Sniadach cases are said by petitioner to hold
that "the opportunity to be heard must precede any actual deprivation of private
property." Their import, however, is not so clear as petitioner would have it: they
merely stand for the proposition that a hearing must be had before one is finally
deprived of his property and do not deal at all with the need for a pretermination
hearing where a full and immediate post-termination hearing is provided. The
usual rule has been "[w]here only property rights are involved, mere postponement
of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for
ultimate judicial determination of liability is adequate." Phillips v. Commissioner,
283 U.S. 589, 596-597 (1931).
Id. at 611. See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 186-90 (1974) (opinion of White, J.). In
Arnett, a non-probationary employee of OEO was removed from his job by way of a statutory
procedure after he was accused of making recklessly false accusations about a superior. The
employee was given notice of the proposed adverse action and was informed of his right to
reply to charges. Kennedy was then fired after foregoing his reply and was informed of his
right to appeal. Kennedy instituted a suit in federal court seeking relief from the
government's interference with his property rights without due process. Kennedy argued a
violation of due process. A plurality of the Court held that the expectation of future
employment under the statute did not create a property interest within the meaning of the due
process clause. Thus the case was dismissed before reaching the question of what particular
procedural due process safeguards were required. Justice White, writing separately, assumed
that the employee's interest in continued employment was a property interest and turned to
the due process clause. In determining what form due process procedures must take in the
case, Justice White cited various cases indicating that where property rights alone are at stake,
the prior hearing may be unnecessary if there is provision for an adequate hearing after the
initial taking but before the deprivation becomes final. Id. at 186-90.
45In the Bonner case, it is the statutory tort remedy against state agents. ILL REv. STAT.'
ch. 37, § 439.8(d). See also note 25 supra.
46See note 21 supra & text accompanying.
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is beyond the control of the state. Thus, where personalty is taken through
the negligent acts of a state agent, the provision for a hearing prior to
taking the property is no less impractical than in summary action cases.
The impracticality stems from the same basic source: the specific seizures
that give rise to the need for a due process hearing of some type are not
sufficiently within' the control of the state to allow any type of prior
hearing.
In cases where facts and interests involved demand this somewhat
relaxed due process standard, the courts certainly have not abandoned the
requirement of a hearing. The same cases that have excused the prior
hearing requirement have consistently made note of some opportunity,
subsequent to the initial taking of property, for determination of rights and
liabilities. 47 While language used by the courts over the years no doubt
indicates a preference for the preseizure hearing when property is taken, 48
what is truly required by the Constitution is that a hearing "be granted at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."4 9 This standard clearly
leaves room for subsequent hearings in satisfaction of due process. In
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 0 the Supreme Court further outlined the
flexibility of due process where property rights are taken:
The usual rule has been "[w]here only property rights are involved, mere
postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the
opportunity given for ultimate judicial determination of liability is
adequate."5'
In Bonner v. Coughlin,2 although unable to provide a hearing before
the unanticipated negligent loss of property, the state stood ready to
provide a hearing to compensate the loss after the initial taking. The
statutory remedial machinery provided by the state would assess the actions
of the guards against a suitable standard of care and make whole any loss
sustained when that conduct is found to be wrongful.53
47See, e.g., Sowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944), citing Phillips v. Commissioner,
283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931):
Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry
is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for ultimate judicial
determination of the liability is adequate.... Delay in the judicial determination of
property rights is not uncommon where it is essential that governmental needs be
immediately satisfied.
Id. at 520.
Ewing v. Mytinger &e Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950), states:
It is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned, that there is at some stage
an opportunity for a hearing and a judicial determination.
Id. at 599. See also North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. at 320.
48See notes 33-36 supra & text accompanying.49Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
50416 U.S. 600 (1974).
-
11d. at 611.
52517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975).
5SSee note 31 supra.
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When Judge Stevens made reference to the "important difference
between a challenge to an established state procedure as lacking in due
process and a property damage claim arising out of the misconduct of state
officers,"5 4 he implied that in the normal due process violation there are
two parts to the constitutional transgression. First, the state must take
property from a citizen. It is clear that this has taken place as soon as a
guard destroys or takes personalty from an inmate. Second, the state must
fail to meet the strictures of due process. Normally this would require that
a hearing be given before the first taking of property. In a typical case,
where the state cannot justify its failure to provide a preseizure hearing and
it takes property from a citizen, a "complete" fourteenth amendment
violation has occurred. Under "incomplete deprivation," however, the
flexibility of due process permits a postponed hearing where the negligent
loss of property is unforeseen and unanticipated. At the moment of
deprivation, then, only the first step of a "complete" fourteenth amend-
ment violation has transpired. Under "incomplete deprivation," this
potential denial of constitutional rights will only become "complete" if the
state fails to provide some subsequent judicial determination of liability.
Where the prisoner receives an opportunity to present his property claim in
the traditional courtroom adversary setting, due process is satisfied. The
federal. courts need only conclude that the fourteenth amendment has been
violated "completely" when the state provides no opportunity to determine
and compensate property rights, or the state remedy, while adequate in
theory, is not available in practice.55
THE INCOMPLETE DEPRIVATION THEORY IN INTENTIONAL DEPRIVATIONS
OF PRISONERS' PROPERTY
In Bonner, 56 the court explicitly avoided the unresolved question of
whether section 1983 may be invoked in the case of negligent violations of
constitutional rights.5 7 The court sought to define the precise nature of the
underlying constitutional duty rather than concentrate on the nature of
conduct that will breach an existing duty. There is considerable dispute
over simple negligent conduct as a basis of section 1983 liability.5 If,
however, it is determined that mere negligence is insufficient to invoke
54517 F.2d at 1319. See also note 25 supra & text accompanying.
55See notes 83-84 infra &c text accompanying.
56517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975).
57The court noted that counsel had argued the question of mere negligence as a basis for
a section 1983 recovery in their briefs. The court's treatment of this issue was summary,
however, as this broad question need not be decided in the Bonner case. 517 F.2d at 1318.
58The language of section 1983 gives no indication-of what state of mind or degree of
mens rea is required before liability may be imposed under the Act. There are cases falling on
both sides of the issue of whether section 1983 liability may be based on negligent acts by the
state's agents. For example, many cases indicate that mere negligence may not support a
cognizable section 1983 claim. See, e.g., Madison v. Manter, 441 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1971);
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section 1983, the precise holding of Bonner will be moot. Further, the vast
majority of prisoner property claims arise out of willful seizuresby guards.
For these reasons, a question of more importance than that posed in
Bonner is whether "incomplete deprivation" analysis may be extended to
deprivations in which guards intentionally and arbitrarily seize or destroy a
prisoner's property.5 9
A major apparent obstacle to this extension is the long recognized rule
that intentional misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law, and made
possible because the wrongdoer is vested with authority by the state, is
suffigient grounds for invoking section 1983.60 In Monroe v. Pape,61 it was
held that the illegal acts of policemen could support a section 1983 action
for violation of the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court, after tracing
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act, concluded:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to
afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice,
passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced
and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and
immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by
the state agencies.6 2
The positive language of this statement, read broadly, tends to obscure
equally relevant inquiries in extending section 1983 to any given case.63
Joyner v. McClellan, 396 F. Supp. 912 (D. Md. 1975); Hopkins v. County of Cook, 305 F.
Supp. 1011 (N.D.lll. 1969); United States ex rel Gittlemacker v. Pennsylvania, 281 F. Supp 175
(E.D. Pa. 1968); Kent v. Prasse, 265 F. Supp. 673 (W.D.Pa. 1967), aff'd, 385 F.2d 406 (3d Cir.
1967). There are, however, cases that indicate the contrary. E.g., Brown v. United States, 486
F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1973); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972); McCray v. Maryland, 456
F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Jenkins v. Averett, 424
F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970). Also cf. Anderson v. Nosser, 456 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1972); Whirl v.
Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969); Bailey v. Harris,.377 F.
'Supp. 401 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864 (N.D.I11. 1967). For discussion
of the question of negligence as the basis of section 1983 claims, see generally, Shapo,
Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277 (1965);
Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1486
(1969); Note, Civil Rights & State Authority: Toward the Production of a just Equilibrium,
1966 Wis. L. Rav. 831.59Aside from the facts that the majority of cases involve intentional seizures of property
and that cases arising out of simple negligent conduct may be dismissed on different grounds,
an intentional deprivation at the hands of a prison guard is even more likely to cause an
inmate to initiate a Civil Rights action. The feeling that resort must be made to section 1983
as the only effective means for a prisoner to protect his own rights would seem more likely
when a prison guard purposefully takes a prisoner's property whether out of spite, display of
power, or simply to appropriate the property to his own use.
6°See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91, 107-13 (1945); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 99-100 (1951); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 180-81 (1961); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974).
61365 U.S. 167 (1961).
62 d. at 180.
63See Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 13-
25 (1974):
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While section 1983 itself gives no indication of the kind of conduct
required, it clearly states the necessary result of that conduct: "the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution .... "64 Thus, in any section 1983 action two essential
elements must be established: the conduct complained of must be that of a
person acting under color of state law, and this conduct must have deprived
another of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States. 65 It should be apparent that these two distinct
inquiries must not be carelessly confused if improper extension of section
1983 is to be avoided. The fact that courts have widely accepted
intentional, yet unauthorized, actions of state agents as a basis for section
1983 liability66 speaks only to one half of the whole question of a federal
remedy. The Court's finding in Monroe, for example, is a product only of
the first inquiry. 67 It indicates that deliberate conduct by state officers, even
where it violates the law of the state, is action "under color of" state law. 68
This finding, however, reveals nothing about the successful application of
"incomplete deprivation" to intentional seizures of prisoner property.
Where a prisoner's property is taken or destroyed deliberately, the
elements of a due process violation are the same as in a negligent
deprivation. Regardless of the quality of conduct by the state agents, the
underlying constitutional duty remains the same. To find section 1983
liability there must be a deprivation; there must be a property interest
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment; and the deprivation of
property must take place without due process of law. The deprivation
element of the complete violation is concerned with the harm suffered by
the property owner. The state of mind of the guard has no effect upon the
harm imposed on property interests; property is no more or less "gone" or
"damaged" whether the conduct that leads to the loss is intentional or
negligent. 69 Nor is the characterization of "property" altered by the actor's
state of mind. Assuming that action "under color of" state law has
"deprived" a person of "property," the question becomes whether it is
"without due process of law." As preceding discussion has indicated, due
process requires more procedural safeguards in some cases than others.
The particular facts or interests involved determine the precise dictates of
Notions of negligence and intentional conduct tend to obscure the threshold
concern in 1983 cases. That concern should be whether a constitutional duty
derived from the fourteenth amendment has been breached.
Id. at 23.
6442 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). For text of the Act, see note I supra.65See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 696-97 (1976); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 150 (1970); Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 646 (9th Cir. 1962); Gilpin v. Kansas State
High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp 1233, 1237 (D. Kan. 1974).66See note 64 supra.67That is, the conduct complained of must be that of a person acting under color of state
law.
68See note 62 supra & text accompanying.69But see Judge Fairchild's dissent in Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975):
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due process from case to case. 70 "Incomplete deprivation" allows a post-
interference hearing in deprivation cases where special facts do not
logically permit any other form of procedural due process. Because a
specific negligent loss of property cannot be anticipated to provide a prior
meaningful opportunity to be heard, the normal predeprivation hearing
requirement imposes an impossible standard.71 Thus, where the state has
done all it possibly can to provide a full judicial hearing and determination
after the fact, "incomplete deprivation" deems procedural due process
satisfied. Without the breach of some constitutional "duty," the second
essential element of section 1983 liability is not met. So long as due process
is thus provided in the form of a subsequent hearing, no successful section
1983 claim can be brought.
While it may be possible to conclude that the federal interest in
preventing or vindicating intentional and arbitrary misconduct is greater
than in negligent deprivation cases, such an increased interest makes the
preseizure opportunity to be heard no less impossible to provide. The
deliberate seizure of prisoners' property is solely the product of an
individual guard's volition, and is not in any way within the control of the
state. Such an unauthorized independent act, as opposed to one pursuant
to a state order or law, cannot be meaningfully anticipated by the state in
order to provide a prior hearing. In such a case "incomplete deprivation"
should be applied. Under this analysis, the prisoner is made whole by the
state's own remedial procedures, and the federal courts are spared from
devoting their time to the analysis of simple torts involving small amounts
of property. By providing a federal forum only in cases where a prisoner is
unable to obtain adequate redress in state courts, the federal interests in
both judicial economy and an adequate remedy for deprivations of property
are served.72
INCOMPLETE DEPRIVATION AND THE SUPPLEMENTAL REMEDY DOCTRINE
Perhaps the most significant feature of section 1983 is its role as a fully
I agree that Bonner's claim that the negligence of the guards caused the loss of his
property is not an adequate claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I would base this result
on the proposition that the negligence of a state employee which causes loss of
property is not state action which deprives the owner of property under the
Fourteenth Amendment, nor is it, under § 1983, action under color of state law
subjecting the plaintiff to such deprivation.
Id. at 1321.70See notes 30-55 supra & text accompanying.
71See notes 39-43 supra & text accompanying.72Such deprivations, when intentional, may raise other significant constitutional issues
distinct from any failure to provide procedural due process. See notes 92-94, 96-101 infra &
text accompanying. One such issue might be whether the willful and arbitrary taking of a
prisoner's property by a state officer constitutes a violation of substantive due process by use of
state-vested authority to take property in an arbitrary and unjustifiable manner. See
Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 523 F.2d 1057, 1059-62 (7th Cir. 1975) (Swygert, J., concurring). Cf.
Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1974).
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supplemental remedy providing a federal forum for the enforcement of
federal rights without first requiring that a plaintiff exhaust available
state remedies. The supplemental remedy doctrine was originally artic-
ulated in Monroe v. Pape,7s a case arising when a group of Chicago
policemen illegally entered and ransacked plaintiff's home, subjecting the
occupants to humiliating treatment. The plaintiff was arrested and
removed to a police station for several hours before being released
uncharged. A section 1983 action was brought against the officers alleging
a violation of fourth amendment rights. The defendant argued that section
1983 was inapplicable, in part, because the actions of the police in breaking
into plaintiff's home violated both the laws and the constitution of the
state.7 4 The Court rejected this argument stating:
It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.
The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter
need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.75
The unconditional availability of a federal forum to vindicate federally
created rights is supported by several considerations. Federal courts are
generally thought to be more qualified than state courts to deal with the
nuances of claims emanating from the federal constitution.7 6 The federal
court system may also provide more uniform treatment of civil rights
claims than the states.7 Because of its reliance upon the availability of a
state remedy for the loss of property in precluding the federal forum,
73365 U.S. 167 (1961). McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963), illustrated the first
expansion of the Monroe supplemental federal remedy theory. The lower courts in McNeese
had dismissed petitioner's segregation complaints because of a failure to exhaust state
administrative remedies. The Supreme Court, however, read Monroe and § 1983, "to provide
a remedy in the federal courts supplementary to any remedy any State might have." Id. at 672,
citing Monroe. The Supreme Court has continued to restate the rule that a plaintiff need not
exhaust state judicial remedies: Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 609 n.21 (1975).
74365 U.S. at 172.
7-Id. at 183. For general discussion of the supplemental remedy doctrine, see Chevigny,
Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV L. REv. 1352 (1970); Shapo, Constitutional Tort:
Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277 (1965); Note, Limiting the
Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486 (1969); Note, Civil
Rights and State Authority: Toward the Production of a Just Equilibrium, 1966 WIs. L. Rzv.
831; Comment, Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLUM. L. RV.
1201 (1968).
76See Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1352, 1356-59
(1970). But see Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's
Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw & Soc. ORD. 557.
Judge Aldisert argues that in fact state trial and appellate judges from eight major American
cities process more constitutional issues every day than the whole federal judiciary does in a
week. The Judge supports this contention with statistical data. Id. at 572.
77See Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV L. REv. 1352, 1356-59
(1970), arguing that a federal remedy is more likely to be uniformly applied because of the
more efficient pyramidal organizaion of the federal court system from distict courts, through
the appellate courts, to the Supreme Court. See also McCormack, The Expansion of Federal
Question Jurisdiction and the Prisoner Complaint Caseload, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 523, 529-30.
[Vol. 52:257
1976] PRISONER PROPERTY DEPRIVATIONS 275
"incomplete deprivation" appears to conflict with the supplemental
remedy doctrine as announced in Monroe. Such a dispute is avoidable,
however. In Monroe the constitutional right underlying the section 1983
claim was the fourth amendment guaranty against unreasonable searches
and seizures, applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. "Incomplete deprivation" would be inapplicable
to such a case because it is based upon the examination of an entirely
different constitutional "duty."78  Under the suggested approach, an
evaluation of exceptional factors where a prisoner's property is taken by a
guard acting beyond the knowledge or control of the state permits the
conclusion that a subsequent hearing satisfies the fourteenth amendment.7 9
The basis for this constitutional reading is that where property rights, as
opposed to liberty interests, are taken away by the state, due process may
require entirely different procedures.80 Monroe v. Pape, and most section
1983 cases, invoke constitutional rights which, because they involve
interests other than property, or facts which logically permit a hearing
before property is taken, cannot be subjected to postponed due process
standards. In these cases due process demands a prior hearing. Therefore,
when an interference with constitutional rights takes place in the typical
setting, there is nothing that can later be done after the initial interference
to avoid the completed due process violation. A violation of the fourth
amendment protection against unreasonable searches cannot be cured by a
later hearing, as can a taking of property which might be returned or
compensated after the fact.
Reliance upon a subsequent state remedy to satisfy the due process
hearing requirement is not a departure from the supplemental remedy
feature because the state remedy plays an entirely different role in Monroe
from that in Bonner. In the former the constitutional violation is
complete, and the state remedy serves as no more than an alternate state
remedy for a completed infringement of constitutional rights. As an
alternate source of redress only, Monroe holds that the availability 6f a state
remedy cannot preclude the federal forum under the supplemental remedy
doctrine. "Incomplete deprivation," however, raises the state remedy to
constitutional significance. Because there is no meaningful opportunity
for the state to provide a preseizure hearing, a subsequent hearing suffices
for purposes of due process. Supplemental remedy language in Monroe
assumes that a "complete" constitutional violation has already occurred.
Under "incomplete deprivation," however, the state tort remedy provides
the complainant with a full hearing designed to assess the actions
attributed to the state and to make whole any loss wrongfully sustained by
the prisoner. The fact that this state remedy is provided avoids any
78See notes 88-94, 96-100 infra & text accompanying.79See cases cited in notes 39-44 supra.
8OSee Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611 (1974); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 186-90 (1974) (opinion of White, J.); cases cited at notes 39-43 supra.
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"complete" constitutional violation from every occurring. Thus, the state
remedy under "incomplete deprivation" is not merely an alternative, but an
actual part of the satisfied constitutional duty. Because the constitutional
duty is never "breached," no question of supplemental remedies need ever
be encountered.
OPERATION OF INCOMPLETE DEPRIVATION
Under "incomplete deprivation" analysis the function of the federal
judiciary is altered. By allowing prisoner property deprivations under
section 1983, the federal courts have themselves provided a federal remedy
for tortious conversions at the hands of state agents. A prisoner deprived of
his personalty may sue in federal district court for damages sufficient to make
whole any loss sustained. It makes no difference, under this arrangement,
that the state whose agent commits the tort provides a remedy to
compensate that unforeseeable wrong.
. Under "incomplete deprivation," however, the state courts are allowed
to process these tort claims themselves. Section 1983 and the federal
judiciary then become available only when the state fails to provide the
subsequent opportunity for a hearing, or that remedy is not in fact
available to the prisoner. Thus, the federal courts serve only to insure that
an adequate hearing is provided by the state in cases of wrongful loss or
seizure. As long as the state provides an adequate remedial hearing for the
tortious conversion, a type of remedy which the state courts rather than
federal courts have traditionally provided,8' the federal interest in providing
a deprived state prisoner with some fair remedial procedure is vindicated.
This arrangement will also allow the states to affect their own interest in
policing the internal operation of their prison systems. Clearly the state
has an interest in punishing misconduct by its own prison guards. Where
the state imposes liability for transgressions by its own agents, a clear
policy against such excesses is displayed - perhaps a worthwhile policy in
view of general distrust of the correctional system. It might also be
expected that the allocation of judicial authority between state and federal
courts encouraged by "incomplete deprivation" would improve the state
remedies available. By so improving their remedies for mistreated
prisoners, the state can avoid federal intervention into the internal affairs
and operation of the state's prison system.
"Incomplete deprivation" brings the use of the federal courts and
"As Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in his dissent in Monroe v. Pape:
The jurisdiction which Article III of the Constitution conferred on the national
judiciary reflected the assumption that the state courts, not the federal courts, would
remain the primary guardians of that fundamental security of person and property
which the long evolution of the common law has secured to one individual as
against other individuals. The Fourteenth Amendment did not alter this basic
aspect of our federalism.
365 U.S. at 237.
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section 1983 into line with the traditionally recognized purposes of the
Civil Rights Act. In Monroe v. Pape,82 the Court enumerated three basic'
purposes behind section 1983: 1) to override certain kinds of state laws; 2)
to provide a federal remedy where the state law is inadequate; and 3) to
provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in
theory, is not available in practice.8 3 When the state provides a remedy for
a wrongful loss or seizure of property by its agent, and that remedial
hearing also satisfies the requirement that a due process hearing be granted
at some time, there is no constitutional violation; nor is there any purpose
behind section 1983 providing a federal remedy. There is clearly no specific
law to be overridden. Only when the state fails to provide a practically
available remedy will the federal courts become involved. To continue to
allow prisoner property deprivation cases to be heard in the first instance in
a federal court, while the state offers a make-whole remedy, enlarges the
Civil Rights Act and the fourteenth amendment to a fully alternate means
of processing ordinary common law tort claims.84 As the Supreme Court has
recently noted:
It is hard to perceive any logical stopping place to such a line of
reasoning. Respondent's construction would seem almost necessarily to
result in every legally cognizable injury which may have been inflicted by
a state official acting under "color of law" establishing a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. We think it would come as a great surprise to
those who drafted and shepherded the adoption of that Amendment to
learn that it worked such a result, and a study of our decisions convinces
us they do not support the construction urged by respondent.8 5
"Incomplete deprivation" analysis provides, by examination and inter-
pretation of underlying constitutional rights, a credible theory for exclud-
ing troublesome cases from the federal courts. The theory itself rests upon
an accepted reading of the fourteenth amendment due process clause.8 6
Reliance upon the state remedy is crucial only in determining that due
process is not violated, thus, abandonment of the supplemental remedy
doctrine is not necessary.87  Regardless of considerations of simple
negligence, gross negligence, or intentional conduct, all of which go to the
82365 U.S. 167 (1961).
831d. at 173-74.
4See Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts
on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw & Soc. ORD. 557; Shapo,
Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277 (1965);
Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486
(1969); Note, Civil Rights and State Authority: Toward the Production of a Just Equilibrium,
1966 WIs. L. REv. 831. See also note 14 supra & text accompanying.8 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 698-99 (1976). See also Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of
Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal
Caseload, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORD. 557.
86See notes 39-44, 47-51 supra & text accompanying.
87See notes 73-80 supra & text accompanying.
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kind of conduct that constitutes action taken "under color of" state law,
"incomplete deprivation" analysis suggests that the constitutional right to
a due process hearing when property is taken is not breached. So long as
no constitutional duty is violated, no kind of conduct will give rise to a
successful section 1983 action in federal courts. 88 Moreover, "incomplete
deprivation" does not imply a retreat to a pre-Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp.,89 distinction between personal liberty and property rights as the key
to federal jurisdiction. 90 Federal jurisdiction over deprivations of property
interests is clearly left intact by "incomplete deprivation" analysis. Under
"incomplete deprivation" the federal forum is not precluded on a simple
characterization as "property" rights; instead unforeseeable and uncon-
trollable deprivations of prisoners' property are excluded from federal
courts because due process requires lesser safeguards in such cases. The
approach theoretically achieves a "surgical" removal of prisoner property
claims brought on a theory of denial of procedural due process. Because
"incomplete deprivation" is based solely on cases outlining the contours of
procedural due process in the context of property deprivations, it has no
application where a section 1983 claim is brought under some other
constitutional right. "Incomplete deprivation" is justified only by the
flexibility of procedural due process requirements where a prior hearing is
not feasible.9 1 Thus, when a prisoner brings a section 1983 suit alleging
some other constitutional duty, "incomplete deprivation" is not applicable,
and a state remedial hearing offered at some later time will not prevent the
conclusion that a "complete" constitutional violation has occurred. For
instance, in Bonner,92 the prisoner alleged an alternate theory of liability
under section 1983. He argued that the negligent loss of his trial transcript
interfered with his constitutional right of access to the courts.9 3 Assuming
that the loss of the transcript did in fact amount to such an interference, the
negligent acts of the guards that gave rise to that interference were no less
unforeseeable than those underlying the procedural due process claim. The
court, however, vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded for trial
on the access claim.94 Thus, when the underlying constitutional duty
alleged becomes one other than procedural due process in the context of a
88See notes 56-72 supra & text accompanying.
89405 U.S. 538 (1972).
90For a discussion of this distinction, see note 17 supra & text accompanying.
91See notes 39-44, 47-51 supra & text accompanying.
92517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975). See also Butler v. Bensinger, 377 F. Supp. 870 (N.D.Ill.
1974).
93See Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 632-34 (7th Cir. 1973); Sigafus v. Brown, 416 F.2d
105, 107 (7th Cir. 1969); DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682, 685-86 (9th Cir. 1966). See also Johnson
v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), where the Supreme Court noted, in determining that a state may
not enforce a regulation which absolutely bars inmates from furnishing legal assistance to
other prisoners in preparing petitions for post-conviction relief: "it is fundamental that access
of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints may not be denied or
obstructe." Id. at 485.94Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d at 1320-21 (7th Cir. 1975). The court noted, however:
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deprivation of personalty, "incomplete deprivation" is not justified.
Because infringement of the interest in access to the courts cannot be
adequately compensated after the fact, as can a pure property deprivation,
and the prisoner's interest in continued access to the courts is too great to
be subjected to a post-interference hearing standard, "incomplete depri-
vation" analysis cannot be successfully applied. The required hearing
cannot be postponed, thus, the constitutional violation is "complete" as of
the effective interference, and section 1983 becomes available.
This narrow effect is desirable to the extent that "incomplete depri-
vation" analysis precludes the federal forum only in cases at which it is
specifically aimed.95 Where a prisoner is able to state a constitutionally-
based claim independently of a procedural due process failure, "incomplete
deprivation" does not preclude federal relief. The approach is applicable
only where a mere tortious conversion, remediable in the state courts, of
otherwise constitutionally insignificant property96 is alleged. There is,
however, a price for the minimal side-effects upon the overall efficacy of
section 1983 in the prisoners' rights context; merely be pleading some
alternate theory of constitutional infringement, a prisoner can side-step the
application of "incomplete deprivation." Thus, when a prison guard takes
property from an inmate, "incomplete deprivation" may provide a solution
to the procedural due process claim, but the prisoner may still obtain a
federal forum on the same facts by claiming the deprivation amounted to
an interference with another constitutional right. Such results are possible
Until we know whether there has been an interference with Bonner's
constitutionally protected right of access to the courts, it is premature to express a
somewhat abstract opinion on what kind of knowledge or intent on the part of the
officers would make such interference actionable under § 1983.
Id. at 1321. The court thus avoided the issue of whether mere negligent conduct that results in
deprivation of a prisoner's rights is sufficient to state a claim under section 1983. It is
interesting to note, however, that the Supreme Court has recently held that a claim of mere
negligent malpractice resulting in injury to an inmate does not state a viable Civil Rights
claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 97
S.Ct. 285 (1976).
95Because "incomplete deprivation" is based on the impossibility of providing a prior
hearing in case of property deprivations, rather than a generally lesser interest of a prisoner in
continued possession of his property, the approach may provide relief from similar types of
claims arising outside of the prison setting. The common illustration given for the extent to
which a creative plaintiff may stretch section 1983 is:
A walks out of a building and is struck by a truck. The truck is state owned and is
operated by B, a state employee, acting in the course of his employment. A sustains
a broken leg. A does not have to go into state court; under Lynch he can claim a
fourteenth amendment deprivation of property ....
Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section
1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw & Soc. ORD. 557, 571. Because the
deprivation is unforeseen and beyond the knowledge or control of the state, "incomplete
deprivation" may well preclude federal jurisdiction in such a case so long as the state provides
A with a make-whole remedy against its agent, B, to compensate for the loss of property
sustained.
96See notes 92-94 supra & text accompanying.
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under the right of access to the courts, 97 the first amendment, 98 the fourth
amendment, 99 or the eighth amendment. 09 However, while such artful
pleading may avoid "incomplete deprivation," infringements of these
rights have traditionally been the grist of section 1983. Extensions of the
federal forum to claims of this nature are not troubling, even when they
arise out of the same deprivations of personalty. 101  "Incomplete depri-
vation" seeks to preclude the federal forum in cases stating only a claim for
tortious conversion that can be competently and adequately compensated
in a state court.
STEVEN H. HAZELRIGG
97See Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975); notes 92-94 supra & text
accompanying.9SIn Nickens v. White, 536 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1976), a state prisoner brought suit when
his office supply catalogue was confiscated by a prison guard. The inmate's due process claim
was dismissed, yet the court held that in light of a recent Supreme Court decision, the
prisoner's first amendment rights had been infringed. Id. at 804, citing Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
HSee Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1974).
'
00Cf. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 649 (E.D.Va. 1971), citing Wright v.
McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127, 139-41 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036,
1061-62 (E.D.Pa. 1969); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786, 792 (M.D.Tenn. 1969).
'
0 Even where "incomplete deprivation" successfully precludes the federal forum, the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction may bring the state conversion claim before a federal court.
For instance, a prisoner may state a cognizable section 1983 claim based on the eighth
amendment. If in that case, the property deprivation arises from the same nucleus of operative
fact, a federal court might be expected to try both the federal and the state claims in one
judicial proceeding. See Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 523 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1975). For a
general discussion of pendent jurisdiction see H. HART &c H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
Sc THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 917-26 (2d ed. 1973).
